University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
Himalayan Research Papers Archive

Nepal Study Center

10-6-2007

The Effect of Remittances on Child Labor and
Child Education in Nepal
Michael Milligan
Alok Bohara

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nsc_research
Recommended Citation
Milligan, Michael and Alok Bohara. "The Effect of Remittances on Child Labor and Child Education in Nepal." (2007).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nsc_research/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Nepal Study Center at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Himalayan Research Papers Archive by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

The Effect of Remittances on Child Labor
and Child Education in Nepal
Michael Milligan
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Abstract
Remittances from international sources form an important part of the typical Nepalese
household’s income. We analyze the effects of household international remittance and nonremittance income on educational achievement and the amount of child labor using Heckman’s
two-step analysis. For the analysis of educational achievement, the ratio of years of schooling
to age is the independent regression variable, and a dummy variable representing whether or
not the child has attended school at all is used as the select variable. For the analysis of child
labor, the number off hours spent working in the labor force is the regression independent
variable and a dummy variable representing whether or not the child has worked in the
previous year is the select variable. It is determined that remittance income from international
sources positively contributes to child welfare, but much less so than the same amount of
income from other sources. Several socioeconomic variables, such as caste and the child’s
gender, are also analyzed, and in many cases found to have significant effects.
Keywords: Nepal, education, child labor, remittances

The Effect of Remittances on Child Labor and Child Education in Nepal
I. Introduction
The welfare of children in Nepal has been a focus for both the Nepalese government
and international national NGOs, particularly since multiparty democracy was restored in 1990
(Baker and Hinton, 2001). In particular, it has often been a goal in Nepal to 1) increase the
amount of education children receive and 2) reduce the amount of time children work, or
alternatively, the number of children who work at all. These goals are intertwined, since,
ceteris paribus, a child who does not have to work will have more time to devote to school.
There are several reasons why the children of a Nepalese household might not attend
school. Education represents an investment in time and (in Nepal, usually to a much lesser
extent) money. If there are few employment opportunities for educated people, the return to an
investment in human capital might be lower than the return from other uses of time and money,
such as labor. Poor school quality would also reduce the return to investment in education.
There is also the risk that even if an educated child can find gainful employment, this may not
benefit the household, since when the child is grown there is no guarantee that he or she will
contribute to the household’s income.
Particularly for poor families, the costs associated with education may be more than the
household can or is willing to support. These costs are direct (books, fees, uniforms, etc.) and
indirect (the opportunity cost of the child not working). It is reasonable to assume that the
indirect cost of the child not working is particularly important in Nepal, since most direct
expenses are funded by the state. Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world; according
to one measure, 31% of the population live below the poverty line (CIA, 2006). Agriculture, a

profession traditionally reliant on family labor, is the main economic activity of three-fourths
of the population (CIA, 2006).
Child labor has several adverse consequences. The most immediate is the compromise
of children’s health and leisure time. Also, since child labor often displaces education, when
children have to work, their future human capital is often reduced, negatively affecting the
individual, the household, and the society. However, not all see child labor as an unqualifiedly
negative phenomenon. In some circumstances, the child’s income might be necessary to help
the family achieve basic subsistence; in such a case, a ban on child labor that does not address
its root causes would only exacerbate the children’s and the households’ already unfortunate
situation. In some cases, a working child might gain skills and knowledge that will serve him
in the future, when he or she works as an adult. Moreover, in Nepal, social networks and
contacts are very important to finding a good job, often more important than education (Baker
and Hinton, 2001); working may allow some children to make more useful contacts than they
would make by going to school. For an agrarian society like Nepal, the role of a child as a
worker on the family farm is much older and more traditional than the Western view of an
ideal child’s life, a life of education and leisure activities (Baker and Hinton, 2001).
This paper focuses on the affects of household remittance income on children’s
education and on child labor. Many families receive remittance income from Nepalese
workers working abroad, particularly in India and the Middle East. There are good reasons for
supposing that remittance income might have a different effect on education than income from
other sources, such as wages or salaries. Those households that can afford to send someone
abroad to work might represent a higher income sample than average, thus spending more on
all forms of consumption, including education. Furthermore, the remittance sender might have

influence over the household’s actions and spending patterns. Remittance income may often
be a more reliable source of income than income earned in Nepal; this is particularly intuitive
for subsistence farmers, whose income is as often stable as the weather. Stable sources of
income might be more likely to be spent on necessities such as food and housing, and less
likely to be spent on “luxuries” such as education.
Studies of the impacts of remittance income usually focus on how the budget shares of
certain categories of goods (such as food, durables, housing education, health, etc.) vary
between remittance-receiving and non-remittance-receiving households. When remittance
income is primarily spent on durables or housing, it is often concluded that remittance income
does not contribute significantly to education or other forms of productive investment.
However, a simple analysis of spending on education is inappropriate when most children
receive education freely, or almost freely, as in Nepal. In such a case a source of income’s
most important role might be to allow the household to forgo the value of the child’s labor.
Thus, the child is more likely to attend school, and will have more time to devote to school if
he or she does attend. We examine directly how remittances affect a child’s educational
attainment and the amount the child works.
We perform two separate regressions, each using Heckman’s two-step estimation
procedure, to examine how remittance income affects educational achievement and child labor.
For educational achievement, the normalized quotient of a child’s class and age is used to
create an education index, in order to compare the achievements of children of different ages.
The qualitative select variable in this case is a dummy describing whether the child has
completed any school at all. For child labor, the number of hours children work in a year
(including household labor) is the regression variable, while the qualitative select variable is a

dummy indicating whether the child has worked at all in that year. The data is from the Nepal
Living Standards Survey, undertaken across Nepal in 2003-2004.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows: in Section II is a review of some of the
literature pertaining to child labor, education, and remittances, particularly in Nepal. In section
III is described the theoretical model to be analyzed, and the theory behind Heckman’s two
stage regression in particular. In section IV is a description of the data used for analysis and
some summary statistics. In section V is discussed the regression technique used. In section
VI the results of this regression are discussed. In section VII some concluding remarks are
made.

II. Literature Review
Modern research into child labor has been influenced greatly by a paper by Basu and
Van (1998) outlining a theoretical link between low income and child labor. They established
a theoretical microeconomic framework wherein the decision for a child to work was made by
the household to help ensure the household’s survival, and was not primarily the result of
selfish decisions by parents and employers. They argued that if parents could earn higher
wages themselves, they would not send their children to work. According to their analysis, in
some situations, economies may have more than one type of equilibrium: equilibria wherein
wages are low, and children must work to support the household; and equilibria where wages
are higher, and children do not work.
Since this paper, several empirical studies have examined the link between poverty and
child labor or education. Jensen and Nielsen (1997) analyzed the activities of students in
Zambia based on the assumption that for each child, households faced a binary decision: to
send the child to school, or to engage the child in labor. In this context they analyzed the

effects of several variables on the probability that a child would attend school. The concluded
that poverty was an important reason why children do not attend school, since distance to
school (considered a cost) and the proportion of household members working were associated
negatively with school attendance, while the head of household education and household
savings and assets have positive effects on school attendance.
Amin, Quayes, and Rives (2004) performed a similar analysis in Bangladesh to
determine the probability that a child would work. By dividing their sample into income
quintiles and using dummy variables to indicate the poorest, poor, middle, rich, and richest
income groups, they analyzed how this probability varied with income, along with other
household and individual characteristics. They determined that poverty was the most
important cause of child labor.
There has been much speculation and analysis on how remittances affect economies at
the microeconomic and macroeconomic level. A 2005 study by the International Monetary
Fund found that remittances contribute significantly to economic growth in poorer countries
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005). At the same time, some have claimed that remittances pose
moral hazard problems, and could lead the receiving family to work less or make riskier
investments, and thus have an overall negative effect on GDP growth (Chami et al, 2003). It
has also been claimed that remittances actually increase rather than decrease inequality, since:
rich countries get the benefit of poor countries’ laborers; poor countries’ suffer increased
inflation from the artificial influx of money; and migrants returning home to poorer countries
are likely to have unrealistic employment aspirations and thus become a member of their home
country’s unemployed (Keely and Tran, 1989).

Several studies have analyzed the influence of remittance income, as opposed to
income in general, on education spending, though few, if any, have analyzed directly how the
educational attainment of children in remittance-receiving households differs from that of
children in non-remittance-receiving households. Conclusions as to whether remittance
income is more likely to be spent on education than other sources of income vary depending on
the study. Stahl and Arnold (1986), in a survey of several studies of the effects of remittances
on spending patterns in Asian countries, found that those receiving remittances spent more on
the margin on food, durables, and housing, and less on investments like education. In contrast,
Adams (2005), using a 2000 household budget survey to perform a similar analysis on
Guatemalan households, found that remittance income was more likely to be spent on
education than other sources of income. These differing results could reflect genuine
differences in how remittance income is spent in different parts of the world, or simply be
artifacts of the different methodologies used.

III. Theoretical Model
The choice of which model to use to determine the effects of different kinds of income
on both child labor and educational attainment is not trivial. One option is the use of a
dichotomous choice model, where it is assumed that children either work and do not attend
school or attend school and do not work (as in Jensen and Nielsen, 1997). This is not
appropriate for our analysis, since many children in our sample both attend school and
participate in the labor force. Another option is to use a bivariate dichotomous choice model,
with dummies indicating if the child attends school and if the child participates in the labor
force as the independent variable. This option, however, like the simple dichotomous choice
model, would ignore important quantitative information. We wish to examine not only if a

child works, but how much time he or she devotes to work; and not only if a child attends
school, but how well the student performs in school.
To incorporate both qualitative and quantitative information, we make use of
Heckman’s two-stage estimation technique. Consider the analysis of child labor. Let
LABORPARTi be a dummy variable indicating whether or not child i participated in the labor
force in the year of the study. Let LABORPARTi* be the change in the household’s utility if the
child participates in the labor force, such that
*

(1a)

*

(1b)

LABORPARTi = 1 if LABORPARTi > 0
LABORPARTi < 1 if LABORPARTi < 0
Suppose that
kL

LABORPARTi = α L1,i + α L 2,i lincrem + α L 3,i lincome + ∑ α Lj ,i x Lj ,i + ε L ,i
*

(2)

j =4

where lincrem is the log of remittance income from international sources, lincome is the log of
income not derived from international remittances or child labor, xLj,i represents the value of
the jth independent variable for individual i, and ε L,i is an error term.
Let lhoursi be the log of hours that child i has worked in the past year1. In our study,
this includes activities that generate wages, work in family businesses (including subsistence
farming), and household chores. Suppose that
mL

lhours i = β L1,i + β L 2,i lincrem + β L 3,i lincome + ∑ β Lj ,i x Lj ,i + u L ,i

(4)

j =4

mL

< lhours i >= β L1,i + β L 2,i lincrem + β L 3,i lincome + ∑ β Lj ,i x Lj ,i

(5)

j=4

1

In fact, lincome, lincrem, and lhours represent the log of (relevant quantity plus one), to avoid
undefined responses resulting from observations of zero.

and suppose that u Li and ε Li have a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and correlation
ρL. The quantity lhours is only observed if LABORPARTi = 1 . The quantity of interest is
*

therefore the expected value of lhours i given that LABORPARTi > 0 , which can be shown to
be2

E (lhoursi | LABORPARTi > 0) =< lhoursi > + ρ Lσ ε L
*

φ (< LABORPARTi * >)
*

1 − Φ(< LABORPARTi >)

(6a)

where E ( z | Y ) means the expected value of z given event Y, σ ε L is the standard error of εL.,
and φ (z ) and Φ (z ) are, respectively, the normal probability density function and the normal
*

cumulative density function of z. The observed quantity lhoursi | LABORPARTi > 0 varies
stochastically such that
*

*

lhours i | LABORPARTi > 0 = E (lhours i | LABORPARTi > 0) + v L ,i

(6b)

where v L ,i follows a normal distribution with mean 0.
As per Heckman’s procedure, the coefficients in equation (2) were then estimated using
maximum likelihood probit estimation. These results were used to calculate
*

< LABORPARTi > , the values of which were substituted into equation (6), so that the
coefficients in equation (4) and (implicitly in (6b)) could be estimated using an ordinary least
squares regression of equation (6b).
The model for educational attainment is similar. Let SCHOOLINGi be a
dummy variable = to one if child i has completed at least one year of school, or if child i
currently attends school. Let SCHOOLINGi* be the change in a household’s utility from
having a child who has gone to school. Then
2

A more thorough treatment can be found in Greene (2003, pp. 782-787).

*

(7a)

*

(7b)

SCHOOLINGi = 1 if SCHOOLINGi > 0
SCHOOLINGi < 1 if SCHOOLINGi < 0

For educational attainment, we define edindexi as the adjusted ratio of years of
schooling completed to age, assuming that a typical Nepali child begins school at age 5 (an
index similar to that used by Ruan and Bohara, 2004). That is, if schoolyearsi is the number of
classes successfully completed by student i with age agei,
edindexi =

schoolyear si + 5
if SCHOOLINGi = 1
agei

edindexi = 0 if SCHOOLINGi = 0

(8a)

(8b)

We can now specify
kE

SCHOOLINGi = α E1,i + α E 2,i lincrem + α E 3,i lincome + ∑ α Ej ,i x Ej ,i + ε Ei
*

(9)

j =4

kE

< SCHOOLINGi >= α E1,i + α E 2,i lincrem + α E 3,i lincome + ∑ α Ej ,i x Ej ,i
*

(10)

j =4

mE

edindexi = β E1,i + β E 2,i lincrem + β E 3,i lincome + ∑ β Ej ,i x Ej ,i + u Ei

(11)

j =4

mE

< edindexi >= β E1,i + β E 2,i lincrem + β E 3,i lincome + ∑ β Ej ,i x Ej ,i

(12)

j =4

and so

E (edindexi | SCHOOLINGi > 0) =< edindexi > + ρ E σ ε L
*

*

φ (< SCHOOLINGi * >)
*

1 − Φ(< SCHOOLINGi >)
*

edindex i | SCHOOLING i > 0 = E (edindex i | SCHOOLING i ) + v E ,i

(13b)

where σ ε E is the standard error of εE and ρE is the correlation between the error terms in
equations (9) and (11).

(13a)

The coefficients in equation (9) were then estimated using maximum likelihood probit
estimation. These results were then substituted into equation (13a), so that the coefficients in
equation (11) could be estimated using an ordinary least squares regression of equation (13b).

IV. Data and Summary Statistics
The data used for this paper came from the 2003 Nepal Living Standards Survey,
conducted from April 2003 to April 2004 by Nepal’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The
survey follows the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey methodology and
uses a two-stage stratified sampling scheme (CBS, 2004). The survey included 3912
households, including 21531 individuals, of which 6478 were between the ages of 5 and 16
(the age group of focus for this paper). A similar survey was conducted by the CBS in
1995/1996; CBS reports significant increases in several important indicators of educational
attainment during that time. For example, the percent of the population aged 15 and above that
had ever gone to school increased from 34% to 43%; for this same group, mean years of
schooling (amongst those who had some schooling) increased from 7 to 7.5 years; and
enrollment rates increased for every level of schooling, especially for females (CBS, 2004).
We calculate from this survey certain statistics pertaining to our sample, i.e. children
aged 5 to 16. Of this group, 21.9% had never attended school. In the year of the survey,
31.5% both attended school and worked; 15.7% worked and did not attend school; 41.1 %
went to school and did not work; while 11.8% did neither. Thus, total child labor rates were
47.2%, and 78.1% of this group had some schooling. In rural areas, child labor rates were
51.9%, while 74.3% had some schooling. These differences between the rural population and
the general population probably indicate the tradition that children assist in family farm labor,
though may also indicate less school accessibility.

Since so many students both attend school and are part of the labor force, it does not
seem appropriate to address schooling and labor purely as an “either/or” choice. However,
educational attainment may be effected by child labor. As an indicator of whether or not this is
so, we calculated that 35.0% of children who worked had an age-adjusted educational
attainment (the educational index variable, elaborated upon in the next section) below the
mean; only 26.9% of those who did not work had an educational index below the mean. There
does seem, therefore, to be a trade-off between child labor and educational attainment. The
purpose of this paper is to examine how international remittances contribute to both of these
factors.
Table 1, which reports the primary reasons why completely unschooled children in the
sample had not attended school, as reported by the household. These results support the claim
that for many households, low incomes significantly and negatively affect education; and that
education often conflicts with a household’s need for the child’s work.

Table 1: Primary Reasons for Never Attending
School amongst Children 5-16
Reason

Percentage of Children

school not present

1.41

too expensive
too far away

19.52
4.68

had to help at home
education not useful

13.78
1.33

parents did not want
not willing to attend
disabled
other reasons

20.23
15.28
1.33
22.44

Table 2, which shows the primary reason why children ages 5-16 who had previously
attended school left school, also supports these conclusions: over half of students in this group
left school because they had to help at home, or because their academic progress was poor.

Table 2: Primary Reasons for Leaving
School amongst Children 5-16
Reason

Percentage of Children

further schooling not available

2.79

too expensive
too far away

15.88
2.51

had to help at home
parents did not want

25.35
10.31

completed desired schooling
moved away
poor academic progress
environment of school not good

3.34
1.39
27.02
1.11

other reasons

10.31

Appendices A and B contain descriptions and summary statistics, respectively, of
variables used the econometric analysis done below. Those statistics pertaining to households
apply only to those households studied here, which effectively means households with children
between the ages of 5 to 16. Those statistics pertaining to individuals apply to children from 5
to 16.

V. Regression Method
Aggregate household income was calculated by summing reported income from various
sources, namely, revenue from agriculture and livestock operations, rental income, remittance
income, income from enterprise, wage income, and other sources (such as investment in stocks
or bonds). Also included in income was the value of agricultural products produced by the

household for self-consumption, and, for those who owned their homes, the opportunity cost of
not renting the home to others (as estimated by the household). We excluded the income of
children age 16 or less from the aggregate3. Since prices can vary widely across Nepal,
household income was divided by regional price indices to generate real aggregate income.
This real aggregate income was divided into two categories: that from international remittances
(referred to in this study as “remittance income”) and that from all other sources4 (referred to in
this study as “non-remittance income”).
A Hausman test indicated that remittance and non-remittance income should be
instrumented on a set of dependent variables. Firstly, robust OLS regressions were performed
to obtain fitted values for non-remittance income. Since many households (2308 of 2799
households) received zero remittance income, a tobit model was used to obtain fitted values for
this quantity. Both of these regressions were done at the household level. Fitted values of
remittance and non-remittance income were generated. The results of these instrumentation
regressions are in Appendix C.
Likelihood ratio tests indicated that, in the case of both education and labor, it was
necessary to use Heckman’s two-stage estimation process to consistently estimate coefficients.
The fitted values of remittance and non-remittance income were used in two separate
regressions, each using Heckman’s two-stage estimation technique, at the individual child
level. The theory behind this technique is presented in Section III. The first regression uses

3

It was straightforward to exclude wage income earned by children. Less obvious was how to
exclude the value of agricultural products produced by the children, since it was not known how
much of these products were produced by which family members. To be able to exclude this
income as well, we assumed that the proportion of income generated by the child was equal to the
proportion of hours worked by the child (i.e., if child labor accounted for half of total household
hours of work in agriculture, then half of the income from agriculture was excluded from the
income aggregate).
4
Since it the log of income, rather than income itself, which we use as independent variables, four
households with negative incomes were excluded from our sample.

labor force participation as the dependent variable in the equation of sample selection, and the
log of hours worked by the child as the dependent variable in the primary equation. The
second regression uses whether or not the child attends school or has successfully completed at
least one grade as the dependent variable in the equation of sample selection, and the child’s
age-adjusted educational attainment as the dependent variable in the primary equation. The
results of these regressions are presented in Appendix C.

VI. Regression Results
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results in tables 7a, 7b, 8a, and 8b in
Appendix C. Firstly, children in rural areas are more likely to work, and work longer, than in
urban areas, even when controlling for the child’s family being subsistence farmers. Children
in rural areas are also less likely to attend school. This is probably due to school’s being more
inaccessible in rural areas, as well as a more traditional rural mindset regarding the role of a
child and the importance of a Western-style education. When a household’s caste is
significant, the children in that household almost invariably work more, go to school less, and
do worse in school than the unspecified castes, Brahmin and Chhetry. This is not surprising,
since these castes are traditionally the most privileged in Nepalese society. Children from
larger families are no more probable to work than those from smaller families, but when they
do, they work longer hours. They are also less likely to go to school and do not do as well in
school as children from smaller families. This is probably simply the result of the family’s
resources being divided between more family members.
The case of female children is interesting. They work more often and longer hours than
their male counterparts, a conclusion which is perhaps not surprising (since household work,
included as labor, is traditionally the role of the female). They are also less likely to go to

school than male children; but when they do go to school, they do slightly but statistically
significantly better than males. This may be the result of selection bias; that is, a female may
have to be smarter or otherwise have more scholastic potential for a family to send the child to
school, as compared to a male child.
The role of remittance and non-remittance income is interesting. Both classes of
income contribute positively and significantly, to child welfare (the one exception being in the
regression of the education select variable, SCHOOLING; in this case remittance income
contributes positively but insignificantly): increased household income implies that a child is
likely to have to work, will work fewer hours if he or she does work, is more likely to go to
school, and does better in school if he or she attends. However, the coefficients are very
different. In all cases, income from remittances contributes much less to child welfare than
income from other sources. This may be because remittance income is a steadier stream of
income than that from other sources, and thus more likely to be spent on essentials such as
food and housing than on education. However, without further analysis to determine how
remittance income is spent in Nepal, this is speculation5.

VII. Conclusions
The effects of remittance income on child welfare (from the point of view of educational
attainment or child labor) are unambiguously positive. That they are less significant than the
effects from non-remittance income does not change this conclusion. It can be concluded that
were the Nepalese government or some other agency to enhance the flow of remittances into
Nepal, children would benefit. However, this should not be done at the expense of income from
other sources.
5

In fact, the same conclusions would be drawn if remittances were treated as “found money” and
spent on luxury items. Thus, children would still have to work to support the family’s basic needs.

There is much improvement for the remittance-sending system in Nepal. Remittances are
usually sent through informal channels, through couriers whose job it is to transport remittances
from the worker to his or her family. Invariably, these couriers take a significant share of
remittances for themselves, and in some cases simply abscond with the money. Establishing a
more formalized transmission network would allow more remittances to reach their targets, and
hence, one would intuit, amplify their existing affects on Nepalese households.
In sum, it can be concluded that remittance income positively contributes the welfare of
Nepalese children, though less so than non-remittance income. Improving remittance flows to
Nepal, while not interfering with other income-generating sources, would benefit Nepalese
children. However, the large difference in coefficients suggests that a higher priority would be
to increase Nepal’s GDP through other channels.

Appendix A: Description of Variables Used
Table 3: Description of Variables Used at the Household Level
Variable Name
lincome

flincome

Description
log of total household income plus 1, less income from
remittances from international sources or from family members
age 16 or less
log of household income from remittances from international
sources plus 1
fitted values of lincome after instrumentation

flincrem

fitted values of remittance income after instrumentation

lincrem

HEADUNMARRIED dummy variable = 1 if head of household is unmarried
HEADMIGRATED
HEADFEMALE
headage
headeduc
TAMAGURALI
DAKASA
TERAICASTE
NEWAR
MUSLIM
OTHER CASTE
hhsize
SUBSAG
landvalue
finansoph

RURAL
MOUNTAIN
HILL

dummy variable = 1 if head of household migrated to current
residence
dummy variable = 1 if head of household is female
age of head of household
years of education successfully completed by head of household
dummy variable = 1 if head of household is of Magar, Tamang,
Rai, Gurung, or Limbu caste or ethnicity
dummy variable = 1 if head of household is of Kami, Damai,
Dholi, or Sarki caste or ethnicity
dummy variable = 1 if head of household is of Tharu, Yadav,
Bramhin Terai, Thakur, or Hazam caste or ethnicity
dummy variable = 1 if head of household is of Newar caste or
ethnicity
dummy variable = 1 if head of household is Muslim
dummy variable = 1 if head of household does not fall into
categories covered by above five caste/ethnicity dummy
variables, and is not Brahmin or Chhetry.
number of people in household
dummy variable = 1 if subsistence agriculture is at one of the
head of household’s occupations
log of the value of the land owned by household, plus 1
financial sophistication of the family, proxied by the number of
financial instruments the family (including savings accounts,
fixed deposit accounts, stocks/shares, provident funds, pensions,
commission fees, and instruments reported as “others”)
dummy variable = 1 if household is located in rural area
dummy variable = 1 if household is located in mountain
ecological zone
dummy variable = 1 if household is located in hill ecological
zone; Terai (plains) ecological zone is unspecified

Table 4: Description of Variables Used at the Individual Child
Level
Variable Name
LABORPART

FEMALE

Description
dummy variable =1 if the child labored as the past year (including
wage-earning labor, work in the family business, including
subsistence agriculture, or household work)
natural log of the number of hours the child worked in the past
year, plus one
dummy variable = 1 if the child has successfully completed at
least one year of school or is currently in school
the child’s educational attainment, proxied by the number of years
the child has successfully completed, plus one, divided by the
child’s age
dummy variable = 1 if the child is female

age

the child’s age

transtime

the number of minutes needed for the child to travel from his/her
home to school (not available for children with no schooling)

lhours
SCHOOLING
edindex

Appendix B: Summary Statistics for Variables Used
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Household Level (n=2799)
Variable Name

mean

minimum value

maximum value

10.81

standard
error
.0205

lincome6

0

19.16

lincrem7

1.75

.0728

0

13.54

flincome

10.79

.0116

9.18

13.95

flincrem

1.58

.0322

.0145

10.22

HEADUNMARRIED .108

.109

0

1

HEADMIGRATED

.436

.00938

0

1

HEADFEMALE
headage
headeduc
TAMAGURALI
DAKASA

.183
44.47
3.24
.204
.080

.0904
1.672
.0814
.00762
.00512

0
14
0
0
0

1
93
15
1
1

TERAICASTE

.0850

.00527

0

1

NEWAR
MUSLIM

.0893
.0535

.00539
.00422

0
0

1
1

OTHERCASTE

.200

.00753

0

1

hhsize
SUBSAG

6.21
.74

.0483
.0083

1
0

32
1

landvalue
finansoph

9.21
1.12

.101
.0109

0
0

16.21
1

RURAL

.742

.0083

0

1

MOUNTAIN

.094

.00552

0

1

HILL

.461

.00942

0

1

6

Mean real non-remittance, non-child labor income is 161,477.7 Nepalese Rupees, with a
standard error of 75,015.31. This statistic is heavily influenced by outliers; if the nine individuals
with such income over 1,000,000 rupees are dropped, the mean is 76,912.48 with a standard error
of 1,729.83. Removing outliers does not change any of the important conclusions of this paper.
7
For the subset of households who receive remittances, the mean amount of remittances
received(in price-adjusted real terms is 55,684.94 Nepalese Rupees, with a standard error of
90,194.3.

Table 4: Summary Statistics: Individual Child Level (n=6472)
Variable Name

mean

minimum value

maximum value

.587

standard
error
.00931

LABORPART

0

1

lhours

3.72

.0612

0

8.49

SCHOOLING

.804

.00750

0

1

edindex8

.698

.00709

0

3.5

FEMALE

.452

.00941

0

1

age

11.86

.0656

5

16

31.67

.725

0

240

transtime

8

9

If only the population for which edindex does not equal zero is considered, edindex has a mean
of .868 with a standard error of .00346.
9
The variable transtime is only defined for the population currently attending school.

Appendix C: Regression Results
* **

, , and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.

Table 5: Results for fitting of the log of non-international remittance,
non child-labor household income (lincome); R2=.3715; n=2799
Variable
HEADUNMARRIED
headeduc
HEADFEMALE
headage
SUBSAG
landvalue
hhsize
TAMAGURALI
DAKASA
TERAICASTE
NEWAR
MUSLIM
OTHERCASTE
MOUNTAIN
HILL
HEADMIGRATED
finansoph
constant

Estimated Coefficient
-.04161
0.06212***
-.3592***
.006748***
-.4241***
.01523***
.08297***
-.1463***
-.2752***
-.05652
.3375***
-.1678**
-.1563***
-.1929***
-.1703***
.05562*
.3620***
9.7459

Standard Error
.06097
0.004173
.05683
.001345
.04510
.003637
.005446
.04351
.05492
.06275
.07669
.07321
.04694
.05016
.03951
.03348
.02647
.09044

Table 6: Results for fitting of the log remittance income from
international sources (lincrem); Wald Chi-squared = 566.88; n=2799
Variable
HEADUNMARRIED
headeduc
HEADFEMALE
headage
SUBSAG
landvalue
hhsize
TAMAGURALI
DAKASA
TERAICASTE
NEWAR
MUSLIM
OTHERCASTE
MOUNTAIN
HILL
HEADMIGRATED
finansoph
constant

Estimated Coefficient
-4.6577***
-.1709
15.5345***
.1679***
2.5751**
.04820
.6831***
-.3506
2.8025*
-2.6357
-7.6288***
2.6508
.5143
-2.0049
-1.1015
2.0321**
1.0857
-29.6740***

Standard Error
1.5593
.1244
1.0575
.04086
1.1757
.09559
.1614
1.1178
1.3150
1.7244
2.2404
1.8800
1.3054
1.5914
1.0199
.8940
.7022
2.6559

Table 7a: Heckman two-stage regression results on labor primary
equation (lhours) Wald Chi-squared = 699.33; n=6472
Variable
flincome
flincrem
FEMALE
headeduc
hhsize
TAMAGURALI
DAKASA
TERAICASTE
NEWAR
MUSLIM
OTHERCASTE
RURAL
MOUNTAIN
HILL
age
SUBSAG
constant

Estimated Coefficient

Standard Error

-0.5538***
-0.06749***
0.4443***
0.006306
0.04610***
0.06443
0.08794
0.3606***
0.1027
0.7022***
0.4307***
0.1920***
0.02064
0.2480***
0.1388***
-0.1440**
9.5769***

0.07991
0.01308
0.03956
0.008362
0.01145
0.05659
0.07454
0.09425
0.09703
0.1086
0.07434
0.06614
0.07730
0.06007
0.007197
0.07010
0.8403

Table 7b: Heckman two-stage regression results on labor selection
equation (LABORPART) Wald Chi-squared = 699.33; n=6472
Variable
flincome
flincrem
FEMALE
HEADUNMARRIED
HEADEDUC
HEADFEMALE
hhsize
TAMAGURALI
DAKASA
TERAICASTE
NEWAR
MUSLIM

Estimated Coefficient
-0.2449***
-0.09797***
0.54819***
-0.10919
-0.02522***
0.2431
-0.007298
0.07325
0.004755
0.02317
-0.1384
-0.1095

Standard Error
0.09432
0.031465
0.038604
0.075813
0.008842
0.16480
0.011293
0.05728
0.08714
0.08449
0.09516
0.1033

OTHERCASTE
RURAL
MOUNTAIN
HILL
age
SUBSAG
constant

0.09066
0.5095***
0.3250***
0.1106**
0.2392***
0.3546***
-0.7268

0.06741
0.05456
0.07343
0.05304
0.006353
0.06844
0.9961

Table 8a: Heckman two-stage regression results on education
primary equation (edindex) Wald Chi-squared = 366.13; n=6472
Variable
flincome
flincrem
FEMALE
headeduc
hhsize
TAMAGURALI
DAKASA
TERAICASTE
NEWAR
MUSLIM
OTHERCASTE
RURAL
MOUNTAIN
HILL
transtime
_cons

Estimated Coefficient

Standard Error

0.02962***
0.004744***
0.01245**
0.004771***
-0.005615***
-0.03444***
-0.05245***
-0.02759***
-0.004220
0.05192
-0.02173***
-0.009099
-0.01154
-0.005836
.0000852
0.5958***

0.009324
0.001790
0.006009
0.0009335
0.001407
0.006743
0.009684
0.01053
0.01024
0.03699
0.007975
0.005940
0.009210
0.006308
.0000726
0.09745

Table 8b: Heckman two-stage regression results on education
selection equation (SCHOOLING) Wald Chi-squared = 366.13;
n=6472
Variable
flincome
flincrem
FEMALE
HEADUNMARRIED
HEADEDUC
HEADFEMALE

Estimated Coefficient
0.8226***
0.03367
-0.3904***
-0.3308***
0.009939
0.4664***

Standard Error
0.1042
0.03276
0.03916
.07323
0.009566
0.1732

hhsize
TAMAGURALI
DAKASA
TERAICASTE
NEWAR
MUSLIM
OTHERCASTE
RURAL
MOUNTAIN
HILL
SUBSAG
constant

-0.1001***
-0.1436**
0.1905**
-0.3033***
-0.3112***
-0.7552***
-0.5037***
-0.4981***
-0.0022
0.1088**
0.3766***
-6.9712***

0.01132
0.06308
0.09460
0.09048
0.1187
0.1005
0.07145
0.06442
0.07755
0.05942
0.07169
1.1025

Bibliography
Adams, Jr., Richard H. 2005. “Remittances, Household Expenditure, and Investment
in Guatemala.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3532.
Amin, Shahina, Quayes, M. Shakil, and Rives, Janet M. “Poverty and Other
Determinants of Child Labor in Bangladesh.” Southern Economic Journal 70 (4): 876-892.
Baker, Rachel and Hinton, Rahcel. 2001. “Approaches to Children’s Work and Rights
in Nepal.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 575 (May 2001):
176-193.
Basu, Kaushik and Van, Pham Hoang. 1998. “The Economics of Child Labor.” The
American Economic Review 88:3 (June): 412-427.
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 2004. Nepal Living Standards Survey Statistical
Report. Central Bureau of Statistics, Kathmandu, Nepal.
Central Intelligence Agency. 2006. The CIA Factbook: Nepal. Internet:
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/np.html. Accessed: September 23, 2006.
Chami, Ralph, Connel Fullenkamp and Samir Jahjah. 2003. “Are Immigrant
Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?” International Monetary Fund
(IMF) Working Paper 03/189. Washington, DC.
Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric Analysis: Fifth Edition. Singapore: Pearson
Education.
Giuliano, Paul and Marta Ruiz-Arranz. 2005. “Remittances, Financial Development,
and Growth.” IMF Working Paper.
Jensen, Peter, and Nielsen, Helena Skyt. 1997. “Child Labor or School Attendance?
Evidence from Zambia.” Journal of Population Economics 10: 407-424.
Keely, Charles B. and Bao Nga Tran. 1989. “Remittances from Labor Migration:
Evaluations, Performances, and Implications.” International Migration Review 23:3.
Ruan, Xiaomin and Alok K. Bohara. 2004. “The Evidence of the Impact of Intra
Household Balance of Power on Children’s Welfare: Evidence from Nepal.” Unpublished
draft.
Stahl, Charles W. and Fred Arnold. 1986. “Overseas Workers’ Remittances in Asian
Development.” International Migration Review 20: 4.

